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The Forfeiture of Coverage Defenses Rule: An
Economic Analysis∗
Tom Baker, Ezra Friedman, and Kyle D. Logue
July 25, 2017
Abstract
In liability insurance, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to cover.
Thus it is possible that an insurer that has a duty to defend a suit may not
have the duty to cover the policyholder’s liabilities in the suit. However, if
the penalty for a breach of the duty to defend is limited to actual legal costs
spent by the defendant, the insurer may have an incentive to refuse to defend,
even when the duty to defend is clear. This occurs because the insurer will not
internalize the consequences of an inadequate defense when it ultimately can
avoid covering the claim. If the penalty for a breach of the duty to defend also
includes a forfeiture of the right to contest coverage of the claim, the insurer will
never refuse to defend when the duty to defend is clear, but such a penalty could
induce an insurer to defend even when it has a good legal argument against the
duty to defend. We argue that tying a forfeiture of the right to assert any
defense of coverage to an unreasonable refusal to defend can give an insurer
incentives to internalize the cost of an inadequate defense while allowing the
insurer to make reasonable legal arguments challenging a duty to defend.
∗We thank conference participants at Northwestern University, The Society of Industrial and
Organizational Economics(2016) and the American Law and Economics Association (2017). All
errors are our own.
1
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919372 
1 Introduction
Notwithstanding the importance of liability insurance to the development and financ-
ing of tort liability in the United States, there are significant gaps between the tort
liabilities that defendants face and the liability insurance that is available.1 Similar
gaps exist in noncommercial liability insurance, such as that provided in auto and
homeowner’s policies. Every liability insurance policy offered on the U.S. liability
insurance market provides protection against only a defined set of liabilities and for
only a defined period of time. Even a party who consistently purchases every type of
available liability insurance will be unable to find coverage for all potential tort lia-
bilities. Some liabilities are uninsurable, because of moral hazard, adverse selection,
or other market imperfections. Other liabilities, though insurable in theory, turn out
not to be covered in practice, because of liability insurance market segmentation or
exaggerated concerns about moral hazard or adverse selection. In such cases, certain
claims simply fall into the gaps that exist within the patchwork of available policies.
Moreover, some liabilities are entirely insurable; however, because of the segmented
nature of the liability insurance market, it may not be clear which particular claims
are covered under which particular policy.2
For all these reasons, it is surprisingly common for there to be uncertainty about
whether a particular liability insurance policy provides coverage for a particular claim.
This uncertainty presents especially significant practical and legal problems when
the policy also provides defense coverage, meaning that the insurance company has
promised not only to pay the damages for which the defendant may be liable, but
also to provide a lawyer to defend the insured. When a liability insurance policy
provides defense coverage —as most liability insurance policies sold in the U.S. do—
the insurance company must make a decision at the very outset of the case about
whether to provide that defense.3 However, at that early point in the development
of the case, it may be impossible to obtain all the information needed to determine
with certainty whether the insurer is obligated to pay a judgment rendered against
the insured in the case.
U.S. liability insurance law has rules that instruct insurers about how to act in
the face of this uncertainty and that provide incentives for insurers to follow those
instructions. In general, these rules reflect the common understanding that liabil-
ity insurance is a service purchased by risk-averse individuals to reduce uncertainty.
1See, for example, Abraham [2001] p.86 ("[S]ome of the most important developments in CGL
insurance over the last two decades have involved the placement of limitations on the scope of
coverage provided by this form of insurance. Special-purpose forms of insurance that exist alongside
CGL coverage have not completely filled the resulting gaps in insurance protection").
2For a discussion of "market segmentation exclusions" in liability insurance policies, see generally
Baker and Logue [2017]
3For a general discussion of the "duty to defend" in most liability insurance policies, see Jerry &
Richmond [2012], pp 792-832 and Hall [2015]
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Notwithstanding the consistency between this common understanding and the eco-
nomics of insurance, however, these rules have developed through a common law
process that has only rarely taken economic analysis into account and, with one ex-
ception, has never applied insights from a formal economic model.4
In this paper we develop an economic model to analyze an important and contro-
versial legal rule —the forfeiture-of-coverage-defenses rule— that is commonly under-
stood to increase insurers’ incentives to defend their insureds in situations in which
there is uncertainty about whether the insurer would be obligated to pay a judgment
in the case.5 Under the forfeiture-of-coverage-defenses rule, an insurance company
that does not defend its insured when it should have must pay any judgment entered
against the insured, even if the insurer would not have had to pay the judgment had
it properly defended the claim.6 The rule is called the ‘forfeiture-of-coverage-defenses
rule’ because it means that an insurer that wrongly refuses to defend an insured for-
feits its ‘coverage defenses,’ which is the term used in the insurance trade for any
good reason for not paying a judgment. The forfeiture-of-coverage-defenses rule is an
extra-compensatory remedy that goes beyond the remedies generally available in a
breach of contract case, which would include defense cause and other reliance dam-
ages. Thus the rule is commonly understood to increase insurers’ incentive to defend
their insureds.
This model and our analysis are particularly timely because the forfeiture-of-
coverage-defenses rule is presently under close public examination in the drafting of
the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance. Restatements are authoritative
statements of the law prepared by prominent legal scholars through an iterative,
quasi-public process that includes substantial input from judges, legal academics,
and practicing lawyers, and then formally adopted (and in some cases amended) by
the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI is a 100-year-old organization with a
strong track record of influential law reform projects that harmonize and improve the
inconsistent and sometimes fractious state-based law in the United States.
This paper is significant to the ALI’s restatements in three ways. First, it provides
an economically rigorous justification for the limited forfeiture-of-coverage-defenses
4The exception we have in mind is the application of the disregard the limit rule to questions of
bad faith refusal to settle. For an example of use of a simple model, see Transport Ins. Co. v. Post
Express Co., 138 F. 3d 1189, 1192.(7th Cir. 1998)
5See Nardoni[2017] "Courts in several states apply a strict [fofeiture-of-coverage-defenses rule to
enforce the duty to defend found in most liability insurance policies. This rule encourages insurers
to honor their defense obligations by extending liability for breaching a duty to defend beyond the
standard compensatory damages of the insured?s costs of defense", p53). For additional discussion
of the rule, see Windt[2015], Ingram [1995] and Ostrager and Newman[2017]
6This is the rule in a substantial minority of jurisdictions. Restatement of the Law: Liability
Insurance, Tentative Draft 2017 (RLLI), § 19, Comment c ("Courts in a respectable minority of
states have have held that any time that an insurer refuses to defend a suit in violation of its duty
to defend, the insurer must pay for a judgment entered in, or a reasonable settlement of, the suit,
even if the insurer had a reasonable basis for declining to defend.")
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rule adopted in the Restatement in the Law of Liability Insurance. Second, it is the
first collaboration between Reporters of a Restatement and an economic theorist to
develop a model to deepen the analysis of a legal rule that is in the process of adoption
in the Restatement drafting process. Third, it provides an illustration of the utility
of formal economic modeling to this kind of law reform effort.
We believe we are the first to apply formal economic modeling to an analysis of
an insurer’s duty to defend. Several papers, such as Friedman[2017], Sykes[1994],
Logue[1992] and Meurer[1992] have used economic models to address the related
problem of conflict between insurers and policyholders regarding the desirability of
accepting settlement offers. More broadly, Dana and Spier[1993] focuses on con-
tractual mechansms to minimize conflict of interest between attorneys and clients.
Avraham and Wickelgren[2014] models interactions between third party litigitation
financiers and litigants, but focuses on the private information.
To evaluate the proposed rule, we construct a formal model to examine how the
rule performs under two types of uncertainty: factual uncertainty and legal uncer-
tainty. Factual uncertainty is uncertainty relating to the actual circumstances of
the loss in the underlying case. As an example there may be factual uncertainty as
to whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused intentionally or negligently by the pol-
icyholder. Legal uncertainty, on the other hand, involves the interpretation of the
insurance contract or background legal principles that define the insurer’s duties un-
der the insurance contract. An example of legal uncertainty is doubt as to whether an
absolute exclusion of harm due to pollution applies to a lead paint poisoning claim.7
We examine these two types of uncertainty separately because factual uncer-
tainty typically leads to uncertainty only about coverage of judgments, but not about
whether a defense should be provided. Insurers are generally obligated to provide
a legal defense for the policyholder if the only type of uncertainty is factual uncer-
tainty. As held by the California Court in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 Cal.2d
263 (1966), a "carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within
the coverage of the policy." Many states hold that this applies even if the complaint
alleges facts that, taken alone, would imply no coverage, so long as the insurer knows
or reasonably should know of possible facts outside the complaint that would imply
coverage and that "a reasonable insurer would regard as an actual or potential basis
for all or part of the legal action."8 However, if the factual uncertainty is eventually
resolved in favor of the insurer – for example, it is ultimately determined that there
is no coverage, because the harm was intentional–, the insurer need not cover the
7In some instances, the distinction between legal and factual uncertainty can become blurred. For
example, if the question is whether a given defendant’s behavior, which is known, constituted inten-
tional wrongdoing or mere negligence may depend on the resolution of legal issues, such as the defini-
tion of negligence as contrasted with intentional harm. In such a case, the negligence/intentionality
question would give rise to legal uncertainty. Factual uncertainty, again, has to do with what the
circumstances were that gave rise to the claim in the underlying case.
8RLLI, § 13(b)(2) and comment b.
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judgment. In contrast legal uncertainty leads to uncertainty about whether the pol-
icy even applies to the facts as alleged, implying uncertainty about both the duty to
indemnify (i.e. to provide coverage for judgments) and the duty to defend.
We construct a formal model in which in an insurer and policyholder face a claim
where there is factual uncertainty regarding the duty to indemnify. At first we as-
sume that there is no legal uncertainty regarding the duty to defend and examine
the circumstances under which an insurer may nevertheless refuse to defend under
alternative legal rules. We find that, under these assumptions, when there is no
forfeiture-of-coverage-defenses rule, an insurer may have an incentive to refuse to de-
fend when there is substantial doubt, arising solely out of factual uncertainty, about
the duty to indemnify. Because the policyholder’s expenditure on defense may be lim-
ited by liquidity constraints, an insurer might be able to reduce its expected defense
costs by refusing to defend, even if it must eventually reimburse the policyholder.
The disadvantage to this strategy is that it reduces the quality of defense, and in-
creases the expected liability of the policyholder. When the insurer thinks there is a
good chance that it might ultimately not be required to indemnify, it will not fully
internalize the effect of lower defense quality on expected liability. Thus even if an
insurer is certain that it has a duty to defend, it may intentionally breach that duty
when the only penalty is that it must eventually reimburse the out of pocket defense
costs.
On the other hand, with a forfeiture-of-coverage-defenses rule (henceforth forfei-
ture rule), the insurer will never intentionally breach the duty to defend. By refusing
to defend, the insurer knows that it will eventually reimburse defense costs and, be-
cause of the forfeiture rule, will also be required to indemnify the insured for any
liability. As long as the insurer can defend the policyholder more efficiently than the
policyholder can defend himself, it has nothing to gain by refusing to defend, since
the insurer is liable for any judgment.
We next introduce the possibility of legal uncertainty. For the sake of simplicity
we assume that, if the legal uncertainty is resolved in favor of the policyholder, there
is a duty both to defend and to indemnify, whereas, if it is resolved in favor of the
insurer, there is no duty to defend or indemnify. Looking at a situation of purely
legal uncertainty, we find that there is no difference between a forfeiture rule and a
no forfeiture rule, simply because there is never a case where there is a duty to defend
but no duty to indemnify. Thus, the forfeiture rule simply requires the insurer to
forfeit a coverage defense that would not be successful anyway.
Turning to a scenario of mixed legal and factual uncertainty, we find that the
forfeiture rule may induce the insurer to defend even when there is a considerable
likelihood it may not have a legal duty to do so, a situation we refer to as over-
deterrence.9 The intuition is that, in cases in which the legal uncertainty ends up
being resolved in favor of the policyholder, so, in retrospect, there was a duty to
9We will more precisely define over-deterrence in section 2.3
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defend, but the factual uncertainty is ultimately resolved in favor of the insurer,
so, absent forfeiture, there is no duty to indemnify, the forfeiture rule imposes a
substantial cost on the insurer. On the other hand, in the absence of a forfeiture rule,
if there is substantial factual uncertainty, the insurer may benefit from refusing to
defend and thus lowering defense costs, knowing that it will be able to assert coverage
defenses and likely avoid paying for any judgment.
Under the forfeiture rule, if the insurer is able to costlessly resolve the legal un-
certainty before it makes a decision to defend, it always has an incentive to do so. If
the legal uncertainty will be ultimately resolved in the favor of the policyholder, the
insurer prefers to defend, rather than be forced to indemnify and reimburse a policy-
holder who had to rely on his own low quality defense, by which we mean a defense
that is more likely (than the insurer-provided defense) to result in a judgment against
the insured in the underlying case. Of course, the insurer would prefer not to defend
a case when it had no duty to defend or cover. To the degree that it is possible to
resolve legal questions before it is necessary to mount a defense to the original claim,
the over-deterrence from the forfeiture rule can be ameliorated. 10 Recognizing that
it may not always be possible to do this, it may be desirable to limit the application
of the forfeiture rule.
The Draft Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance limits the forfeiture rule
by applying it only when an insurer ‘lacks a reasonable basis for its failure to defend a
legal action.’11 The comments clarify that an insurer that refuses to defend ‘based on
a reasonable legal theory does not forfeit its other coverage defenses.’12 Our analysis
can be used to support a more formal conception of a ‘reasonable legal theory’ as
one that implies enough uncertainty to reasonably motivate a refusal to defend in the
absence of any factual uncertainty. The goal is to use the forfeiture rule to ensure that
the insurer does not use the pretense of legal uncertainty in a case where it believes
it should defend, but will probably escape the consequences of a poor defense. Our
formal model implies that the degree of legal uncertainty that can make a refusal
to defend reasonable depends partially on policyholders’ ability to provide their own
defense. If policyholders can easily and efficiently provide their own defense, it may
be reasonable for the insurer to refuse to defend when there is only a small likelihood
that its legal theory will be held valid. On the other hand, if policyholders cannot
effectively defend themselves, it will only be reasonable to refuse to defend if the
insurer’s legal theory is more likely to be valid. Thus our formal microeconomic
analysis can be used both to examine the justification of the proposed rule in the
Draft Restatement and to suggest refinement in its application.
10This implies an efficiency benefit to an early resolution of coverage uncertainty, which is the
counter to the practice in some jurisdictions of delaying the resolution of coverage until after the
resolution of the underlying tort action.
11Restatement Tent. Draft No. 2 §19 (2)
12Restatement Tent Draft No. 2 §19 (2)
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The next section of this paper presents a model with both factual and legal uncer-
tainty and derives our formal results. The following section considers the application
of the model to the proposed rule and discusses the limitations of our approach. The
final section concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Purely Factual Uncertainty
In period 0, an injury occurs and causes harm D to a plaintiff. The plaintiff has a
tort claim against the policyholder. Initially, we assume that the claim against the
policyholder is such that there is no question about the duty to defend, but there is a
factual question regarding the duty to indemnify. For example, the complaint alleges
both negligence and intentionally caused harm. Therefore, there is a clear duty to
defend, though, depending on how the facts turn out, perhaps no duty to indemnify
the judgment or settlement. We assume the ex-ante likelihood that the facts will
imply a duty to indemnify is λ < 1.
In period 1, the insurer chooses whether or not to defend, and if so, how much to
spend on defense. In this model we suppose that an insurance company has several
advantages in providing a defense. The insurance company can more effectively defend
against the plaintiff. If the insurer provides a defense, the likelihood of liability is
pG(x) > 0, where x is the amount the insurer spends on the defense. We assume that
defense expenditures are effective in decreasing the likelihood of liability, but with
decreasing returns, so p′G(x) < 0, and p′′G(x) > 0. We also assume that p′G(0) <
1
D
, so
some defense expenditures always reduce total liability cost. Finally we assume that
the court is able to monitor the insurer, so the insurer always invests in defense as if it
bears the entire risk. That is to say, when the insurer defends, it chooses expenditure
x∗ > 0 such that x∗ minimizes pG(x)D + x. We discuss the implications of relaxing
this assumption in section3.
If the insurer refuses to defend, the policyholder is left to her own devices regarding
a lawyer. We assume that due to liquidity constraints, or other such issues, the
policyholder can spend no more than x0 on defense. We also assume that the legal
representation hired by the policyholder is not as effective as would be provided by
the insurer. So, if the policyholder arranges the defense and spends x, the likelihood
of liability is pB(x) > pG(x). For now, we assume that the policyholder is aware that
she is likely to prevail on her claim for breach of duty to defend, so she expects to be
reimbursed for legal expenditures. Therefore she will spend as much as possible on
her defense, so she will spend x0. We make the additional assumption that x0 is low
enough so that pB(x0) > pG(x∗), so ultimately, the policyholder is more likely to be
found liable if she defends herself than if the insurer defends.
In period 2 the trial occurs, and the policyholder is found liable (with probability
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pG(x
∗) or pB(x0), depending on whether the insurer defends or not) or not liable with
the complementary probability. Simultaneously, facts are revealed that the accident
is covered. For now, we assume that the probability of coverage is independent of
legal expenditure or liability.
In period 3, if the insurer defends, it pays the claim if it is covered and the
policyholder is liable. If the insurer refused to defend, the policyholder sues for
violation of the duty to defend. Depending on the legal regime and the court’s
evaluation of the reasonableness of the insurer’s refusal to defend, the court can
respond in three ways to the policyholder’s claim. It can rule there is no duty to
defend, in which case the insurer faces no liability for either legal costs or damages.
If the court finds there was a duty to defend, the consequences depend on whether
the rule is Forfeiture (F), or No Forfeiture (NF). Under F, if the insurer is found to
have violated the duty to defend, the insurer must reimburse the policyholder the
defense costs (x0), and must also forfeit its right to assert a coverage defense. Thus
the insurer must indemnify the defendant for any liability, regardless of whether of
whether the facts would imply coverage. Under NF, if the insurer is found to have
violated the duty to defend, the insurer must reimburse the policyholder the defense
costs (x0) as before. Under NF, however, the insurer must indemnify only if the facts
imply coverage.
As noted above, the likelihood that the trial will lead to facts that imply coverage
is λ > 0, so given liability, the complementary probability of no coverage is 1 − λ.
Since an insurer has a duty to defend a case whenever there is a plausible set of facts
that would lead to coverage, under purely factual uncertainty there is always a duty
to defend, but there is not always a duty to indemnify.
Under factual uncertainty, we consider two possible legal regimes, F, and NF,
where the penalty for violating the duty to defend is forfeiture and no forfeiture,
respectively. Thus under both regimes, if the insurer defends, the insurer’s total cost
for the claim is
CDI = x
∗ + λpG(x
∗)D
Under NF, if the insurer refuses to defend when it had a duty to defend, its total cost
is
CNFI = x0 + λpB(x0)D
Under F, if the insurer refuses to defend when it had the duty, it must pay any
judgment against the policyholder regardless of whether the facts imply coverage, so
total cost is
CFI = x0 + pB(x0)D
Our first result is that if the insurer expects the policyholder to spend more in
legal costs then the insurer would spend if it provided the defense itself, the insurer
will always honor its duty to defend.
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Lemma 1 If x0 > x∗, then the insurer will always honor its duty to defend under
both F and NF.
Proof.
Under NF, if the insurer refuses to defend it expects to pay x0 + pB(x0)λD, and
if the insurer defends it expects to pay x∗ + pG(x0)λD. Note that pB(x0)D + x0 >
pG(x0)D+x0 ≥ pG(x∗, q)D+x∗ Since pB(x0)D+x0 > pG(x∗)D+x∗ and x0 > x∗ then
for any λ ∈ [0, 1], pB(x0)λD+x0 > pG(x∗)λD+x∗. Thus, under NF it costs the insurer
less when it chooses to defend. Since pB(x0)D+x0 > pG(x∗)D+x∗ > pG(x∗)λD+x∗,
the insurer defends under F as well.
The insurer is more efficient in providing a legal defense than the policy holder.
If the insurer knows that it will ultimately be responsible for legal costs when it
refuses to defend, then it would never wish to spend more than is optimal in order
to get less effective representation. We do note however that this result assumes that
the policyholder will always successfully sue when the insurer refuses to defend. We
believe that taking into account the possibility that the insurer could ’get away with
it’ would affect our results by introducing the possibility that an insurer would refuse
to defend even if the insurer is more efficient in providing a defense. Turning to the
case where the insurer can save on defense costs by refusing to defend, we have the
following result.
Proposition 1 Under NF, when claims are sufficiently unlikely to be covered, the
insurer may have an incentive to wrongfully refuse to defend. Suppose x0 < x∗, then
under NF there is some threshold degree of factual uncertainty (λ̃ > 0), such that if
λ < λ̃ the insurer will refuse to defend, even when it is certain to be found in breach
of its duty to defend.
Proof. Suppose that x0 < x∗, then under NF the insurer’s net savings from refusing
to defend is x∗ − x0 − (pB(x0) − pG(x0))λD. Define λ̃ = x
∗−x0
(pB(x0)−pG(x0))D
. If λ < λ̃,
then x∗ − x0 − (pB(x0)− pG(x0))λD > 0, and the insurer prefers to refuse to defend
under NF
Under NF, when x0 < x∗, the insurer’s only drawback from refusing to defend
is the increased likelihood that the policyholder is held liable, which leads to an
increased likelihood that the insurer must indemnify. When λ is low, so coverage is
unlikely, the insurer bears a smaller portion of this costs, and is more likely to refuse
to defend.
The forfeiture rule, however forces the insurer to bear the cost of greater expected
liability in the underlying suit, and we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Under F, the insurer will always defend if it knows it has a duty to
do so under purely factual uncertainty.
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Proof. Under F, the insurer pays pG(x∗)λD + x∗ if it defends, and pB(x0)λD + x0
if it refuses to defend. Note that pB(x0)D + x0 > pG(x0)D + x0. Since x∗ minimizes
pG(x, q)D + x, we know that pG(x0)D + x0 > pG(x∗)D + x∗. Finally note that since
λ < 1, pG(x∗, q)D + x∗ > pG(x∗, q)λD + x∗, sopB(x0)λD + x0 > pG(x∗)λD + x∗. and
the insurer prefers to defend.
Thus we have seen that when there is a duty to defend, but there may not be a
duty to indemnify, a rule of NF may not provide enough incentive to honor the duty
to defend. A rule of F will always provide the incentives to honor the duty. One
might worry that the F rule can provide too much incentive to defend, but because
the assumption of purely factual uncertainty implies that there is always a duty to
defend, a model of purely factual uncertainty cannot evaluate the policy consequences
of such excess incentives. We now turn towards a model of purely legal uncertainty,
under which there may not be a duty to defend
2.2 Purely legal uncertainty
We model purely legal uncertainty as the presence of uncertainty regarding the mean-
ing of the insurance contract and the absence of uncertainty regarding factual basis
of coverage. Because there is legal uncertainty regarding the insurance contract, it
is no longer certain that there is a duty to defend. For example, imagine a case in
which the facts clearly establish the existence of lead poisoning, so the only coverage
uncertainty arises out of whether lead poisoning falls inside or outside of the abso-
lute pollution exclusion. Note that there still is uncertainty about liability, perhaps
because the source of the poisoning is unclear, so the expenditure and quality of the
defense of the underlying case is relevant to the insurer until the legal uncertainty
has been resolved. However, because there is no factual uncertainty, the resolution
of questions regarding coverage and duty to defend both turn on the meaning of the
contract, so a finding that the contract does not cover the claim implies there is also
no duty to defend. Thus, in our example, if the exclusion applies to lead poisoning,
there would be no duty to cove or defend
Let us refer to the likelihood that there is a legal duty to defend as γ. Under
purely legal uncertainty, if there is a duty to defend, there is also a duty to indemnify,
so the likelihood of the a duty to indemnify is also γ. We turn to the incentives under
both F, and NF, where the penalty for violating the duty to defend is forfeiture and
no forfeiture, respectively. Thus under either regime, if the insurer defends, but then
challenges its duty to indemnify, the insurer’s total cost for the claim is
CDI = x
∗ + pG(x
∗)γD
Under NF, if the insurer refuses to defend when it had a duty to defend, its total cost
is
CNFI = γ(x0 + pB(x0)λD)
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Under F, if the insurer refuses to defend when it had the duty, it must pay any
judgment against the policyholder regardless of whether the facts imply coverage, so
total cost is
CFI = γ(x0 + pB(x0)D)
Note that since λ = 1 under pure legal uncertainty, the payoffs from refusing to
defend under both regimes are the same. This occurs because the forfeiture rule has
no bite under purely legal uncertainty. Because there are no circumstances under
which the insurer has a duty to defend, but no duty to indemnify, the insurer does
not forfeit anything of value by refusing to defend.
Under either regime, the insurer will refuse to defend if
(1− γ)x∗ + γ(x∗ − x0) > γD(pB(x0)− pG(x∗))
The insurer is balancing the likelihood that it avoids legal costs (either because it
has no duty to defend, or because the policyholder spends less on defense than the
insurer would) against the increased likelihood that the policy holder will be liable,
and will be covered under the insurance. We note that under purely legal uncertainty
regarding the duty to defend, the insurer will always defend if the likelihood of an
actual duty to defend is high enough. Because the duty to cover and duty to defend
depend on the interpretation in the same way, the insurer is always absorbs the
increased likelihood of liability due to inadequate defense if is found to have violated
its duty to defend.
Lemma 2 Under purely legal uncertainty, for any x∗ and x0 >0, there is a γ∗L =
x∗
D(pB(x0)−pG(x∗))+x0
< 1 such that the insurer will honor its duty to defend if, and only
if γ ≥ γ∗L.
Proof. Solving (1 − γ∗L)x∗ + γ∗L(x∗ − x0) = γ∗LD(pB(x0) − pG(x∗)) for γ∗L , we have
γ∗L =
x∗
D(pB(x0)−pG(x∗))+x0
We note that d
dγ
x∗ + pG(x
∗)γD < d
dγ
γ(x0 + pB(x0)D), so if
γ > γ∗L, then x∗ + pG(x∗)γD < γ(x0 + pB(x0)D), and the insurer prefers to defend.
We also note that if γ is low enough, the insurer may refuse to defend even if
x0 > x
∗.
A full treatment of when it would be socially optimal for the insurer to refuse to
defend is beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth noting that when the difference
between pB and pG is greater, so that it is more costly to the defense side for the
insurer to refuse to defend, the insurer will be more likely to defend. Furthermore,
the insurer is less likely to defend when it is less likely that a proper interpretation of
the contract actually imposes the duty.
We might think that this is socially desirable. If there is enough uncertainty as
to whether the policy provides a duty to defend so that the insurer is willing to run
the risks of more liability and possible more expenditure on defense, then it might be
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worth bringing the question of the insurer’s duty to defend before the court because
the resolution of that uncertainty has positive spillovers for future parties to insurance
contracts by clarifying the meaning of disputed clauses in insurance policies.
2.3 Mixed Uncertainty
So far we have shown that under purely factual uncertainty, the forfeiture rule may
be necessary to deter an insurer from intentionally disregarding a duty to defend. If
there is purely legal uncertainty, the forfeiture rule has no effect at all, so it would
not raise issues of over-deterrence.
However, there might be situations in which there is at least some uncertainty
about the exact interpretation of an insurance policy, and there is also some uncer-
tainty about the facts underlying the claim. In particular, we might imagine that
the legal question is resolved in favor of the policy holder, so that there is a duty to
defend and a possibility of coverage, yet when all the factual uncertainty is resolved,
the actual facts imply the claim is not covered.
An example of this mixed uncertainty could arise in response to a lawsuit by a
patient claiming damages from a sexual relationship with a psychiatrist. The insurer
might attempt to disavow a duty to defend or cover, claiming that entering into the
relationship implies an intent to harm as a matter of law. If this is the case, the
insurer has no duty to either defend or to indemnify. If a court finds that intent to
harm cannot be found as a matter of law, then the insurer has a duty to defend but
could still prevail on the coverage question if the facts revealed at trial indicate the
psychiatrist actually had an intent to harm.
We model mixed uncertainty by assuming that the likelihood that the court finds
in favor of the policyholder on the legal question of a duty to defend is γ. If the court
finds for the policy holder on the legal question, the likelihood that the facts imply
a duty to defend so that the policy holder would prevail on the factual question of
coverage is given by λ. Thus the likelihood there is a duty to cover is γλ, Under
mixed uncertainty, the cost to an insurer that defends the claim, yet contests its duty
to indemnify on both legal and factual grounds is:
CDI = x
∗ + pG(x
∗)γλD
Under the No Forfeiture regime, the expected cost to an insurer who refuses to
defend is thus
CNFI = γ(x0 + pB(x0)λD)
Under the Forfeiture regime, the expected cost is
CFI = γ(x0 + pB(x0)D)
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Lemma 3 Under mixed uncertainty and F, the threshold γ∗MF , the threshold strength
of the legal claim for a duty to defend that would cause an insurer to honor its duty
to defend is lower than under pure legal uncertainty.
Proof. At the threshold γ∗F , CFI = CDI . Solving for γ∗F , we have
x∗ + pG(x
∗)γ∗FλD = γ
∗
F (x0 + pB(x0)D)
γ∗F (x0 + pB(x0)D − pG(x∗)λD) = x∗
γ∗F =
x∗
x0 + pB(x0)D − pG(x∗)λD
Note that this is increasing in λ, so it will be lower in the presence of factual uncer-
tainty.
Under the forfeiture rule, the existence of factual uncertainty makes the insurer
less likely to refuse to defend, because by refusing to defend, the insurer loses the
opportunity to contest coverage on factual grounds. By refusing to defend, the insurer
not only increases the likelihood that the policyholder is held liable, but conditional
on the policyholder being found liable, increases the likelihood that the insurer must
cover the loss.
Lemma 4 Under mixed uncertainty and NF, the threshold γ∗NF , the threshold strength
of the legal claim for a duty to defend that would cause an insurer to honor its duty
to defend is higher than under pure legal uncertainty.
Proof. At the threshold γ∗NF , CNFI = CDI . Solving for γ∗NF , we have
x∗ + pG(x
∗)γ∗NFλD = γ
∗
NF (x0 + pB(x0)λD)
γ∗NF (x0 + pB(x0)λD − pG(x∗)λD) = x∗
γ∗NF =
x∗
(x0 + pB(x0)λD − pG(x∗)λD)
So γ∗NF < γ∗F iff pB(x0)λD0 If pB(x0) > pG(x∗), then
x∗
(x0+pB(x0)λD−pG(x∗)λD)
>
x∗
(x0+pB(x0)D−pG(x∗)D)
Under the no forfeiture rule, factual uncertainty decreases the degree to which the
insurer is affected by the downside of refusing to defend. It is a trivial corollary of
Proposition 1, that under the No Forfeiture rule, if x0 < x∗, and λ < 1, there are
some cases where γ∗NF ≥ 1, so that the insurer would refuse to defend even if it was
sure the legal argument would fail.
It is under mixed uncertainty when the trade-offs inherent in the Forfeiture rule
are most stark. In particular, adding factual uncertainty as to whether a claim is
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covered can lead to over-deterrence under the Forfeiture rule and under-deterrence
under the No Forfeiture rule. Both of these effects are strongest when λ is low, so the
trial is likely to reveal a factual basis for denying coverage. When λ is low, Forfeiture
is very likely to force an insurer who refuses to defend to cover a claim it would have
otherwise avoided, so over-deterrence is strong, but under No Forfeiture, an insurer
might see little downside to refusing to defend, because it is unlikely to pay any
eventual verdict.
To deal with this we propose a Limited Forfeiture (LF) rule, which would not apply
Forfeiture as a sanction for refusal to defend if the refusal was made in response to
sufficient legal uncertainty. Our formal definition is as follows
Definition 1 Legal uncertainty is sufficient if that legal uncertainty would motivate
an insurer to refuse to defend a claim in the absence of any factual uncertainty.
Mathematically, an insurer is said to have sufficient legal uncertainty if γ ≤ γ† =
x∗
D(pB(x0)−pG(x∗))+x0
.
When a rule causes the insurer to defend in the presence of sufficient legal uncertainty,
we refer to this as over-deterrence. When the rule causes the insurer to refuse to defend
in the absence of sufficient legal uncertainty, we refer to that as under-deterrence.
This Limited Forfeiture rule has negligence type features, in that it only applies the
forfeiture penalty if the insurer was in some way unreasonable. If there was sufficient
doubt regarding the duty to defend that a reasonable insurer would refuse to defend
in the absence of a fact-based coverage defense, the insurer would still be allowed to
assert fact-based coverage defenses, even if the court finds a duty to defend. Thus,
the only cost of refusal to defend motivated by a sufficient legal argument is that if
the defense fails, and the facts ultimately imply coverage, the quality of the defense
was lower. This standard implicitly requires the insurer to consider the entire net
cost of a lower quality defense, to both the insurer and the policy holder, as a cost of
refusing to defend. If the likelihood that the insurer does not have a duty to defend
multiplied by insurer’s defense costs exceeds the cost of a lower quality defense, then,
by this standard the insurer has a reasonable basis for refusing to defend.
Proposition 3 Under the Limited Forfeiture rule, there will be neither over-deterrence
nor under-deterrence; in the presence of mixed uncertainty the insurer will defend if
γ > γ†, and refuse to if γ < γ†, regardless of the degree of factual uncertainty (λ).
Proof.
Under Limited Forfeiture in the presence of mixed uncertainty, the cost to an
insurer that refuses to defend is a piecewise function of γ, with a discontinuity at γ†
CLFI =
{
γ(x0 + λpB(x0)D) γ ≤ γ†
γ(x0 + pB(x0)D) γ > γ
†
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Figure 1: The thresholds under F, NF, and LF
Recall that the cost to an insurer who defends is: CDI = x∗ + λγpG(x∗)D Note
that x∗ + γ†pG(x∗)D = γ†(x0 + pB(x0)D). Since pG(x∗) < pB(x0) for any λ < 1,
x∗ + λγ†pG(x
∗)D > γ†(x0 + λpB(x0)D)
Therefore if λ < 1 , and γ < γ†, CLFI < CDI , and the insurer will refuse to defend.
Note also that since x∗ + γ†pG(x∗)D = γ†(x0 + pB(x0)D). For any λ < 1, and for
any γ > γ†, x∗ + λγpG(x∗)D < γ(x0 + pB(x0)D), so CLFI > CDI and the insurer will
defend.
Unlike the Forfeiture or No Forfeiture rules, the limited forfeiture rule would
insulate the decision to defend from the influence of factual uncertainty. If there is
insufficient legal uncertainty to trigger the reasonable basis defense to forfeiture, the
presence of factual uncertainty makes the forfeiture penalty more costly, and makes
refusing to defend less attractive, rather than more attractive, so the insurer will
choose to defend. On the other hand, if there is enough legal uncertainty for the
insurer to trigger the reasonable basis defense, factual uncertainty will make refusing
to defend more attractive. Consider the sexual assault example above, if the insurer
was confident that a court would rule that the argument that sexual contact with a
15
patient constituted intent to harm as a matter of law was sufficiently plausible to form
a reasonable basis to refuse to defend, the insurer would not expect to face forfeiture,
even if a court ruled they were bound to defend, so the insurer would not be over-
deterred. On the other hand, if the insurer is refusing to defend, not because the
court is likely to agree there is no duty to defend, but because it thinks it can avoid
the consequences of low quality defense through the fact-based coverage defense that
the doctor did intend to harm, that would not constitute a reasonable basis to refuse
to defend. In this case, the insurer would face forfeiture, so it would be deterred from
refusing to defend on pretextual grounds.
Figure 1 shows how in the absence of factual uncertainty, at the left edge of the
graph, when λ = 1, all three rules (NF,F, and LF), lead to the same legal uncertainty
threshold. As we move right on the graph, decreasing λ and increasing factual uncer-
tainty, the NF threshold decreases, implying that under NF, the insurer requires less
legal uncertainty to refuse to defend. In contrast, the F threshold increases, implying
that under Forfeiture, an insurer would become less likely to refuse to defend. Under
the Limited Forfeiture rule, the legal uncertainty threshold remains unchanged at γ†.
3 Discussion
This paper has examined the performance of a limited forfeiture rule, where an insurer
who refuses to defend a policyholder can contest liability for judgment only if the
refusal to defend was based on a reasonable legal argument. In order to implement
this standard accurately as modeled, a court would need to observe the insurers’
prior beliefs about the validity of their legal claims, as well as know the costs to
the parties of denying a defense. Such knowledge is almost certainly beyond the ken
of the courts. Nonetheless, we believe this formulation of the limited forfeiture rule
has both practical and conceptual value. In particular, this formulation delineates
permissible and impermissible considerations for an insurer deciding whether or not
to defend. The rule makes it clear that the insurer should consider the degree to
which forcing a policyholder to undertake his own defense will negatively impact the
quality and efficiency of the defense, and the insurer may weigh this against the cost
of defending claims when it had it no legal obligation to do so. What the insurer may
not do is discount the negative impact on the defense because it thinks it can get out
of covering the underlying claim.
Turning to the practical effects of uncertainty regarding the reasonable basis stan-
dard, since that standard operates as something like a negligence standard, one might
expect that insurers would react to an uncertain standard somewhat similarly to how
injurers would react to an uncertain negligence standard, so that uncertainty would
cause insurers to defend even more than under a forfeiture rule, similar to the findings
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that uncertainty about the due care standard can lead to excessive care.13 However
the decision of the insurer is a binary one of whether or not to defend. For this reason,
uncertainty about the standard does not necessarily make the insurer more likely to
defend.
More precisely suppose the likelihood of being found in violation of the reasonable
basis requirement is zero when γ = γ†, one when γ = γ̄†) and increasing on the
interval (γ†, γ̄†). In that case, the threshold must be in the interval (γ†, γ̄†). If we
suppose the error is symmetric, so the the likelihood of being found in violation is
exactly 50% at γ†, whether or not the defense threshold is greater than or less than
γ† depends on the parameters. Specifically if the likelihood of liability with a bad
defense is exactly twice the likelihood with a good defense there will be no bias.14 If
the likelihood of being found liable with the insurer provided defense is more than
half that with the policyholder provided, defense15decreasing λ decreases the cost of
defending relative to the cost of refusing to defend, and as λ decreases the insurer
will defend at γ†, implying the threshold falls below γ†. Our conjecture is that if the
uncertainty about the legal standard of a reasonable basis is small, the insurer will
defend if and only if the likelihood of being found in violation of the reasonable basis
requirement is at least the ratio pG/pB.
We have assumed that when the insurer defends, the court can ensure the insurer
provides an optimal defense. To the degree that the court cannot monitor the insur-
ance company, the insurer would have an incentive to reduce the amount it spends
on defense when it thinks it can avoid coverage. One might worry that in an extreme
case, these incentives could make the duty to defend counterproductive, so that a
policyholder would be better off paying for her own defense. Thus the desirability of
enforcing a duty to defend is dependant on the ability of the legal system to ensure
that insurers defend adequately. There is of course a parallel between a claim for
inadequate defense (which is not the subject of this paper), and a claim for wrongful
refusal to defend, and we think it is likely that many of the arguments developed in
this paper would apply to a rule mandating forfeiture of coverage defenses when an
insurer provides an inadequate defense.
Another complication which is not formally addressed here is the effect of pre-
trial settlement. Insurers generally also have a duty to make reasonable settlement
decisions. Thus in the presence of a reasonable settlement offer, a duty to defend also
may entail an element of a duty to indemnify. We note that because this increases the
costs of defense, this gives an additional incentive for an insurer to refuse to defend in
the presence of factual uncertainty. Since most cases end in settlement, choosing to
defend may implicitly entail choosing to indemnify. As a formal matter an insurer has
13See Shavell, Steven, 1987 Economic Analysis of Accident Law
14To see this, consider the sign of ddλ (2λγ
†pG(x
∗)D− λγ†pB(x0)D− γ†pB(x0)) We note that this
will be zero if 2γ†pG(x∗)D = γ†pB(x0)D
15Note this implies that ddλ2λγ
†pG(x
∗)D − λγ†pB(x0)D − γ†pB(x0)) > 0
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a duty to settle a case that it has wrongly refused to defend. As a practical matter it
is typically too late to settle once an insurer has refused to defend, so an insurer may
be able to escape the duty to settle by refusing to defend, and a limited forfeiture
rule would provide more reliable incentives to the insurer.
This paper has focused on characterizing the incentives faced by insurance com-
panies to comply with their duty to defend. We have taken the duty to defend as a
given, and have not challenged the premise that in the absence of legal uncertainty,
an insurer should defend a claim, even when there is only a small chance that the
facts would imply coverage. One might worry that the exclusion in the policy can
be undercut when there is likely to be factual uncertainty and the insurer is likely to
settle any case where there is a duty to defend. In this case, it might be optimal not
to impose a duty to defend when there is only a small possibility of coverage, and
over-deterrence of refusal to defend in the face of factual uncertainty could increase
moral hazard. In order to properly address this question, one must grapple with the
reasons why the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. Future work
may focus on a more complete exploration of the optimal duty to defend.
4 Conclusion
The fact that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to coverage can complicate
the incentives of an insurer deciding whether to defend a policyholder. We argue
that distinguishing between factual uncertainty and legal uncertainty can help us
conceptualize a legal rule that provides incentive to defend while appropriate in the
face of factual uncertainty without over-deterring refusal to defend in the face of bona
fide legal uncertainty. We believe that the Limited Forfeiture rule, as proposed in the
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance is a workable implementation of the
approach suggested by our analysis.
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